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ABSTRACT

This document records the oral and written testimony of participants in a hearing on training policy for the U.S. Navy. The principal witness was Admiral Stanley Arthur, Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Testimony concerned Navy flight training, especially in regard to training pilots for landing on carrier ships, and other aspects of Navy preparedness. Various scenarios of training were reviewed, and the costs of various training alternatives were discussed. (KC)

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NAVY TRAINING POLICY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

MILITARY FORCES AND PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD
JUNE 8, 1993

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NAVY TRAINING POLICY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
MILITARY FORCES AND PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, June 8, 1993.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m. in room 2337, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY FORCES AND PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. SKELTON. Ladies and gentlemen, we will begin our hearing for today. The Ranking Minority Member, Mr. Kyl, is somewhere in the air between Chicago and Washington, and he suggests that we go ahead and proceed.

Last month, Secretary of Defense Aspin formed a task force on readiness consisting of eight retired senior officers of three and four star rank. As part of its charter, this Defense Science Board Readiness Task Force will oversee matters affecting individual and collective readiness including training.

In a recent newspaper interview, President Clinton said the following: "I think we have cut all we should right now. I think we have to maintain a very well-trained military that is well-equipped at a certain level."

I cite the appointment of the Readiness Task Force and the President's recent remarks about having a well-trained force in order to set the stage for today's hearing. As the Military Forces and Personnel Subcommittee continues its work in the first session of the 103rd Congress, I believe that this subcommittee has a proper role in overseeing the training policy of each of the four services. Although the central concern of the readiness subcommittee is overall readiness, all House Armed Services Committee subcommittees oversee defense matters that contribute to readiness.

This morning the Military Forces and Personnel Subcommittee will begin the first hearing in this effort to oversee the training policies for each of the services as those policies affect military personnel. Other hearings will be scheduled as issues concerning training policy arise. This will be an ongoing interest of this subcommittee. We wish to let that be known now.

The purpose of the hearing today is to afford the Members an opportunity to examine the factors which led the Navy leadership to eliminate the requirement for a dedicated, single mission training carrier. It is the issue of flight training of student naval aviators that constitutes the focus of today's hearing.

The Navy, similar to the other services, is undergoing significant force reductions, largely due to the end of the cold war. From a peak of 569 ships in fiscal year 1987, the force at the end of the calendar year 1992 totaled 457 ships, including 14 aircraft carriers and one training carrier. By the end of fiscal year 1994, this force will be reduced to 413 ships, with current plans of 12 aircraft carriers and no dedicated training carrier. The decision not to have a dedicated training carrier was made earlier this year.

Each service is tasked with organizing, training and equipping its forces for prompt and sustained combat. The four services organize, train and equip their respective forces; it is then the responsibility of the combatant commanders in chief, commonly known as the CINCs, to employ those forces assigned to them.

Broadly speaking, there are four components that constitute a ready and capable military establishment: first-rate people; excellent training; superb weapons and equipment—with the spare parts and maintenance that go with the weapons and equipment—and sound fighting doctrine. As each of the armed services is reduced in size, it becomes even more critical to ensure that the remaining forces maintain those crucial elements that make for ready, capable forces.

During the 1970s, as the military reduced the size of its forces after the Vietnam conflict, errors were made that resulted in a hollow force. In his testimony before the subcommittee on March 9, 1993, the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Frank Kelso, defined the term hollow force as insufficient quality manning, inadequate training, inadequate training resources—ammunition and fleet services—limited steaming and flying hours, shortage of on-board replenishment spares, and deferred maintenance.

Today we want to explore the issue of the Navy's dedicated training carrier for student naval aviators: the history of its original establishment and the factors that went into its recent demise. To assist us in this effort we have the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Stanley S. Arthur. The Admiral is a naval aviator himself who completed over 500 combat missions in the A–4 Skyhawk during the Vietnam war.

He assumed duties as Commander U.S. 7th Fleet and Commander U.S. Naval Forces Central Command for operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. He directed the operations and tactical movements of more than 96,000 Navy and Marine Corps personnel and 130 Navy and allied ships, including six aircraft carrier battle groups, two battleships, two hospital ships, four minesweepers and a variety of many other combatant and amphibious ships. He commanded the largest U.S. naval armada amassed since World War II. The Admiral assumed his current duties on July 6, 1992.

Mr. SKELTON. Admiral, we extend to you a warm welcome. Allow me to personally thank you for your past services on behalf of our country.

Admiral, we certainly look forward to your testimony today. Thank you for being with us.

STATEMENT OF ADM. STANLEY ARTHUR, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Admiral ARTHUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is my pleasure to be with you this morning at the subcommittee.

I have a prepared statement that I would like to submit for the record.

Mr. SKELTON. Without objection, the statement will be put fully in the record. You may proceed as you desire.

Admiral ARTHUR. I will just make a few brief comments.

The issue that we are here to talk about today is our decision to put *Forrestal* out of commission and do without a training command carrier, an AVT.

This is a very difficult choice for Navy. In more robust fiscal times, this is certainly not an issue that would have come before us because we have been using a dedicated training carrier for many, many years. The historians in the building tell me we started in 1951, but my memory goes a little bit further back than that. We had sidewheelers up in the Great Lakes in World War II, the *Wolverine*, for example, that conducted training for our combat aviators through flight school.

Mr. SKELTON. What is a sidewheeler?

Admiral ARTHUR. An old steamship with side paddles.

We put a flat top on them and put them in the Great Lakes. That is how some of our newly trained aviators got their first carrier training before going to war in World War II.

We have been very comfortable and dedicated to this asset; but, obviously, in this new era of diminishing resources, we really do have to be very tuned in to how to right size our organization. We have to find different ways of doing business.

There is one more area that is more amenable, one we must pay very close attention to, and that is in the training area. There are efficiencies to be found in training as well, and we must dedicate ourselves more than ever to a good, solid training program.

For aviators, we can train new pilots on board our operational carriers. We have done it in the past when the *Lexington* and *Forrestal* have been out of service for overhauls. We know how to do that. It is not as efficient as we would like, from the standpoint that it does require an operational carrier to be dedicated to the task. Usually we would like to dedicate them to more graduate level type training; but we can do it and have done it in the past and have done it very safely.

So as we had to come to grips with our new equation for the future, we have made the decision to do away with the AVT. It saves us about $98 million a year to do this training aboard our operational carriers. We feel very comfortable that we can continue that training in a very safe manner for our new aviators.

It will give them a chance to see the carrier deck that they will actually fly off in the fleet. So there is a positive aspect from that standpoint; they are now involved with the class of carrier that they will fly off in the fleet.

I would be happy to answer any questions that you or the committee might have, Mr. Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADM. STANLEY R. ARTHUR

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I appreciate your invitation to present the Department of the Navy's Training Policy with specific focus on the Auxiliary Aircraft Landing Training Carrier (AVT). I would also like to update you on significant initiatives undertaken by the Department to ensure that Naval Aviation fully supports the Navy expeditionary force strategy contained in the recently released White Paper, "...From the Sea, Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century," prepared jointly by the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, and Commandant of the Marine Corps.

SHIFTING WORLD ORDER

The world continues to change at a rapid pace. The dramatic shift from bi-polar, superpower dominance to multi-polar, geo-political diversity has necessitated a major revision to Naval Strategy. "...From the Sea, Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century" represents the Navy's new vision and provides the broad framework to build a force structure that is focused on regional challenges and opportunities. It clearly defines the role of the Navy and Marine Corps for the current post-Cold War era and for the next several decades. Emphasis has shifted from preparation for global, open-ocean warfare with the Soviet Union to potential regional conflicts with any number of well-armed Third World powers.

Our forces must be tailored for power projection ashore whether tasked with interdiction of enemy targets or battle field support for land forces. Power projection is a key and critical element of the U. S. Navy's unique core competency.

BUDGET OVERVIEW

The Department's budget for FY 1994 represents a significant departure from prior year biennial budget submissions. Reflecting the Administration's decision to submit a single year FY 1994 budget pending completion of a bottom-up review which will include a Carrier Force Structure, we have taken immediate action which reflects an appreciation for the current fiscal climate and consensus for reduced defense spending.

To meet mandatory budget reductions and to provide funding, in particular, for Naval Aviation modernization, the Department's FY 1994 plan reduces force structure and associated infrastructure without jeopardizing our core capabilities or incurring an

unacceptable level of risk. However, I would like to emphasize that the decision to delete the AVT requirement was affordability driven.

Force structure reductions and revisions will result in the decommissioning of eight aircraft squadrons in FY 1994; accelerating our reduction of carrier force levels to 12, a year earlier than planned; by retiring USS SARATOGA (CV 60) in FY 1994 vice FY 1995 and eliminating the requirement for a dedicated, single mission training carrier, USS FORRESTAL (AVT 59). The dollar savings realized as a result of these FY 1994 affordability based decisions allow us to recapitalize our Navy and Marine Corps Aviation procurement programs.

CARRIER FORCE LEVELS

Despite all the changes to our Naval Strategy, one element of our national security policy that has not changed is our continued reliance upon the aircraft carrier for routine forward presence operations, response to regional crises, and to meet Unified Commander war fighting requirements as we understand them. Calendar Year 1993 has already witnessed the utility of the aircraft carrier in our enforcement of the U.N. sanctioned no-fly zones over Iraq; Restore Hope in Somalia; and ongoing operations in the Adriatic. Despite a decline in carriers we do not see a concomitant reduction in demand for their use. Nevertheless, we believe we can meet our training needs and the projected requirements of the Unified Commanders with a force structure of 12 CVs. We can do this by judicially scheduling non deployed CVs into the training mission. An example of this is USS JOHN F. KENNEDY who recently completed training quals for new aviators off of Virginia.

AUXILIARY TRAINING CARRIER

The Auxiliary Aircraft Landing Training Carrier (AVT), the Navy's dedicated training carrier for student Naval Aviators and Fleet Readiness Squadron pilots, has been a vital, valued asset in the training of Naval Aviators. The AVT had specifically not been included in carrier force structure numbers due to its reduced manning and lack of combat capability. The Navy proposed the decommissioning of USS FORRESTAL as part of the FY 1994 budget recommendations. This initiative provides the Navy with an endstrength and fiscal savings without a reduction in force levels. The Navy can no longer afford a carrier that fulfills a single mission and has a limited combat capability. The Training Carrier Qualification (TCQ) requirement will be completed by operational, non-deployed carriers from the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, which in the past, have on numerous occasions conducted carrier qualifications for student pilots. The Atlantic Fleet carriers will be the primary providers due to increased Temporary additional duty (TEMADD) and operating target (OPTAR) costs, weather and

limited shorebasing facilities on the Pacific coast. OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO will increase slightly with minimal effect on any one operational carrier. This new approach to training will maximize carrier utilization with respect to training required during normal carrier work-up cycles and minimize the total number of days at sea. This increase is offset by combining training normally conducted during a dedicated ship at-sea-period.

COST COMPARISON (OPERATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE) AVT vs. CV/N

The questions have been asked, "Why is the training carrier and not another carrier being decommissioned?" and "How much will this save the Navy"? Decommissioning of the training carrier provides endstrength and fiscal savings of approximately $98M per year without a reduction in the operational carrier force level. Funding of a carrier dedicated solely to carrier qualification training is a significant expense above the cost of the non-deployed carrier force. A cost comparison between the training carrier and an operational aircraft carrier, either conventional or nuclear, is only appropriate if limited to the costs associated with performing the training mission. The incremental costs of using operational carriers for the training mission are minimal, for example, the costs associated with performing the training mission are:

AVT cost:

($M)	FY 94	FY 95	FY 96	FY 97	FY 98	FY 99
O&M	34.1	35.6	36.8	38.3	111.8	17.3
MPN	66.0	68.0	71.0	73.5	76.0	78.3
Total	100.1	103.6	107.8	111.8	187.8	95.6

CV/N cost:

($M)	FY 94	FY 95	FY 96	FY 97	FY 98	FY 99
Total	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2

These latter figures represent an increase in TEMADD/OPTAR funding.

When required, operational carriers perform the training carrier qualification mission concurrent with their funded non-deployed steaming days. For the past year, this has been the case. The decommissioning of the training carrier was possible because other carriers are available to perform this mission within non-deployed operations. The Carrier Qualification mission is not unique to the training carrier (AVT). As an example, USS John F. KENNEDY recently completed Training Carrier Qualifications in the Jacksonville operating area in conjunction with normally scheduled at-sea operations. A total of 1231 Training Command arrested landings were completed without incident. The average number of arrested landings per day was 170 with a high day total of 232.

Training Command Carrier Qualifications were completed on 20 May, three days ahead of schedule. USS FORRESTAL, as an AVT, averaged 160 arrested landings per day in CV-92.

TRAINING

I assure you that are also committed to preserving a quality training program. Underscored by our success in Operation Desert Storm, training is the linchpin of a responsive, viable and lethal force. As our force structure changes, we will continue to balance our program with the proper mix of classroom, simulation and operational training. At-sea training, other than carrier qualification (cryptology, quartermaster and bridge training) once envisioned onboard the AVT will be accomplished as it was prior to USS FORRESTAL designation as the AVT. Technology and jointness offer efficiencies in these areas, and we intend to take full advantage of them in the evolutionary process of maintaining a quality training program; one that allows our best and brightest men and women to achieve their full potential.

SAFETY CONCERNS

Numerous safety concerns have been raised in relation to student Naval Aviators conducting carrier qualifications onboard a Fleet carrier. I want to assure you that all safety related issues have received the highest level of attention and that safety remains at the top of any decision list. Fleet Readiness Squadron (FRS) pilots and Training Command pilots have been safely conducting carrier qualifications on operational carriers when the AVT was in maintenance overhaul. Operational procedures are exactly the same whether flying overhead an operational carrier or the AVT. Flight deck procedures are identical onboard all carriers, and special attention will be paid to the tempo of operations. Additionally, Training Command representatives and Landing Signal Officers (LSO) will be onboard operational carriers when conducting training evolutions.

Concerns about student aviators being required to operate from unfamiliar airfields should not be a cause for concern. Students are required to fly cross country flights during the course of their flight training. The requirement to have an instructor pilot in each flight of aircraft that transit to and from the ship and a safety pilot overhead the ship during carrier qualifications will remain. Safety always has been and always will be paramount.

SUMMARY

In closing, are committed to training and maintaining robust Navy and Marine Corps expeditionary forces capable of operating forward, "... from the Sea." The changes that we are proposing for FY 1994 and beyond represent a significant departure from our previous plans. The decision to delete the AVT was driven by

fiscally mandated reductions in the Department's budget for FY 1994; however, quality training and safety related issues remain steadfast. What has changed is our strategy to fund planned modernization through force structure reductions.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Montgomery.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Arthur, welcome. Thank you for the great service you have given our country. Especially service on your command ship during the Persian Gulf War, we congratulate you for that.

I have two areas that pertain to training, Mr. Chairman, if I could cover them.

The naval air station in Meridian—I see the Admiral grinning like I wasn't going to mention that—trains these students who fly from Kingsville to Meridian and used to fly right on the training carrier. Since that has been eliminated, the U.S.S. *Lexington* has been retired. Also the U.S.S. *Forrestal* which was going to take the place of the *Lexington* has been retired.

As you say, they use the active carriers out there. Maybe it will work, but I am a little concerned. You say it is not as efficient as landing on a training carrier.

We had a sad experience a couple of years ago. One of our students flying from Meridian was supposed to land on the training carrier, but really flew into the bridge and killed three or four people and himself. Landing on that carrier is the toughest thing in flying of all of the services.

I just bring that up, Mr. Chairman, because it is tough. It is tough training. These fellows really sweat it out having to land on a stamp out in the middle of the Gulf with the wind blowing, looking for the ship.

I hope you made the right decision is my point, Admiral Arthur. This is tough flying. Now you are putting them on the operation of a ship. If they fly into the bridge, they can do damage to the ship. It certainly will be out of service for a while. Would you care to comment on that?

Admiral ARTHUR. Yes, sir.

We understand those risks and that accident was on the AVT. We have been able to accomplish training command carrier qualifications on our operational carriers without incident. That is not to say that we might not eventually have an incident, of course.

But there are some plusses in that arena for us. The crew on the operational carriers is really able to provide quality support. They have been in much more stressful environments relative to handling ordnance and operational aircraft. So the flight deck crew is a very highly trained crew. All we really have to do for them is to slow them down. They are used to operating at a much higher pace. So for us, while we are dedicated to the training command part of the evolution, we just have to slow them down and make sure they do not rush the young pilots on the deck.

But as far as being able to handle the emergencies, if we did have an accident, we certainly have our best trained crews available to respond.

We are aware that we could have an accident, but we do feel that the environment is the same as the training command carrier. For most of the ships we will use, we will be operating off a little bit larger deck so there is more room for error than on the AVT.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I might point out to my colleagues that is the first time that these young aviators land on a carrier deck. It is part of their lives as far as flying is concerned. When the ship pulls

out, that is your responsibility, Admiral. You are the number one aviator. I just hope that we do not have serious accidents.

Admiral ARTHUR. I also bring with me a little bit of history in that I went through the training command without ever having a carrier landing. I received my wings without going aboard a carrier and went to a carrier-based squadron on one of our straight decks. So because there was no training command carrier and because in those days we didn't think about using the operational carriers for training students, I ended up missing that part of my education; but I learned very rapidly in a different environment.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I am a little confused. When did you ever land on a carrier then?

Admiral ARTHUR. When I got to my first squadron. I graduated from flight school in August and went aboard the first operational carrier in October.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. My last concern, I am really worried about the reduction of air training in the Navy. Talking about the next 2 years of consolidation of air training of all the services, I don't think there is any question about it—you are going to lose your helicopter training to Fort Rucker; isn't that correct?

Admiral ARTHUR. We are studying that, sir. I would hope the equation does not come out that we would lose it, but we are certainly in the process of studying it.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Considering you are going to lose your basic training, the training naval aviators to the Air Force?

Admiral ARTHUR. No, sir.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. You had not heard that?

Admiral ARTHUR. No, sir. I think we will do lots of joint training in the primary area. Once we get into the basic or advanced areas, we will be in charge of our own destiny. There are such different skills that we have to develop.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I certainly hope so.

What was worrying me is the only training that will be left in a couple of years will be the air strike advance training done at Kingsville and Meridian. You talk about closing Meridian, which is on the base closure list. I hope you keep some air training in the Navy, Admiral. Don't take it all away from you.

Admiral ARTHUR. We will hold on as hard as we possibly can, sir. I guarantee you.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Well, let's hold on to Meridian, too.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Buyer.

Excuse me, may I ask a question first?

Out of curiosity, Admiral, how many carrier landings do you have?

Admiral ARTHUR. I have somewhere over a thousand. I don't know the exact number.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you. Admirable.

Mr. BUYER. I just have curiosity, Admiral. Do you have any statistics on safety records for students landing on active carriers?

Admiral ARTHUR. On the operational carriers, we have been able to do it over the past few years without incident. In fact, *Kennedy* just completed 1,231 student landings recently, at a rate that averaged about 10 more per day than what we normally did on *Forrestal*. That was done without incident. So the one major accident we

have had was in the training command. I have to tell you this is the most dangerous of environments and yet we have had an extraordinary record with our student carrier qualifications.

Mr. Montgomery highlighted the one that we had on *Lexington* a few years ago where a student actually lost control of the airplane and flew into the bridge. That was the first fatal accident we had had in, I think, over 20, 30 years in coming aboard the ship for a student aviator. The safety records are very, very good, for both operational and the training command carriers.

Mr. BUYER. This is for my own edification. When the *Lexington* would go out, the training was not only for naval aviators but also for the crews?

Admiral ARTHUR. For *Lexington*, for a period of time down at Pensacola, we found we could take students from the local schoolhouses that we had in the Pensacola area and take them to sea and do some at-sea training for them.

It was not the complete environment that you would have on an operational carrier, but it was some at-sea time for some of the schoolhouse people to get them used to going to sea and seeing some of their tasks. We can do that by other mechanisms. So that was not a main way of doing business. It was just sort of a pick up because it was available, and we can do that in other ways.

Mr. BUYER. Do you know what your dollar figure is? Because this is being generated by budget. Do you know what the cost is when you take both these ships and mothball them, what the savings will be?

Admiral ARTHUR. Our analysis right now tells us we will save about $98 million a year by not using the AVT and by using the operational carriers. This includes the additional cost of fuel for the operational carriers as well as the additional amount of TAD funds that we will need to take the students from the gulf coast area to one of the coasts, wherever we operate the carrier that they are going to do their qualifications on.

Mr. BUYER. Personnel, what is happening with that?

Admiral ARTHUR. For our personnel, of course, this helps in our downsizing by taking *Forrestal* off the line. The real concern for us was that *Forrestal* was very heavily involved in our Women at Sea program. Now that we have been able to open up more ships to women, we will be able to take them to sea in more operational ships rather than just the AVT. So we will be able to accommodate them also.

Mr. BUYER. All right. I have no further questions at this time.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Lancaster.

Mr. LANCASTER. Thank you.

Always good to see you, Admiral.

Admiral ARTHUR. Yes, sir.

Mr. LANCASTER. If the projections of the base closing and realignment commission are followed, the Navy is going to be coming to Cherry Point out of Cecil Field. I wonder if you could, if you know, and if you do not know today, maybe for the record, can you give us this information on what, if any, additional training facilities are going to be necessary in the Cherry Point area to accommodate the additional Navy squadrons that will be coming there out of Cecil Field?

Admiral ARTHUR. I will have to take that for the record. I think we have more trainers we need to bring to Cherry Point. Other than that, I am not sure. I will provide that for the record.

Mr. LANCASTER. In particular, I am interested in whether or not existing auxiliary fields might see greater use and, if so, which ones, and whether or not any MilCon is going to be necessary for those. That sort of thing. Sort of a rundown on what is expected for increased training needs in the area.

Admiral ARTHUR. Yes, sir.

[The following information was received for the record:]

The proposed closure of NAS Cecil Field and realignment of some of its F/A–18 squadrons, associated staffs and support activities to MCAS Cherry Point may require the construction of some facilities to accommodate increased base loading and training needs. Air operations and training requirements are expected to grow both at Cherry Point and at OLF Bogue Field due to an increased number of aircraft to be based at Cherry Point. The extent of construction that may be required is dependent upon the number of squadrons relocating to Cherry Point; this is under study at this time to ensure the most operationally effective and economical plan is developed. The type of construction that may be required could include:

—Hangar/ramp/simulator/training facilities (to house the squadrons, staffs, simulators, etc.).

—Family housing units.

—Administrative/bachelor's quarters/personnel support facilities.

Once our study is completed, I will provide more detailed information to you.

Mr. LANCASTER. Related to the AVT question, a number of us had the opportunity to visit the Camp Lejeune area several weeks ago. As part of that, we visited the auxiliary field which does have a carrier deck on the ground with the wires and simulated bridge and that sort of thing.

As you take the AVT out, will there be greater use of that training tool? Or is that going to simply be a continuation of an existing policy of using that as an alternative to using an active carrier?

Admiral ARTHUR. I think the answer to that question will be the availability of that field to the squadrons more in the immediate area. I would see its continued use, but I don't think it would increase much over what it is today.

Mr. LANCASTER. I was speaking more generally than just that field, whether or not this is, in fact, a realistic training opportunity that, as a general rule, is going to be used more since you do not have AVT.

Admiral ARTHUR. When we are going to qualify student aviators off of one coast or the other on an operational carrier deck, we first take them to the field that is most available to the operating area for that particular evolution. Then we will use it to familiarize the students with the local base structure. If we get bad weather and they are there for a few days, we have an opportunity to put them in the air and back into the field environment to rehone their skills before we take them out to the sea.

In that scenario, if we were working off the east coast in the operating area off North Carolina, we would come back to that field and give them some time there before we took them out to sea, if there had been any delays.

Mr. LANCASTER. The current situation with reduction in carrier force structure down to 12, I assume the *Forrestal* was not part of that. The AVT was seen as something different than the 12 active carriers?

Admiral ARTHUR. It was. When we finally came down to 12 we made the simultaneous decision for *Forrestal* to go. So we did not include her in that 12 number.

Mr. LANCASTER. Coming down to 12 and eliminating the *Forrestal* are really unrelated?

Admiral ARTHUR. Yes, sir.

Mr. LANCASTER. Of course, when you and I were on the *Hancock* in the late 1960s and early 1970s, we were on a pretty rigorous at-sea schedule?

Admiral ARTHUR. Yes, sir.

Mr. LANCASTER. As we come down to 12, are we going to be increasing the OPTEMPO so these sailors are going to be away from home more? Or are we reducing simply because of a reduced threat that will not increase the time away from home for the carriers?

Admiral ARTHUR. We are not going to increase their time away from home. We are going to hold on to our first OPTEMPO goals that we established over the last few years. We hope somewhere along the line, when push comes to shove, we would get a relaxation of our commitments to make sure that we do not bust those goals; but, as we all know, as you keep coming down in numbers and the overseas commitments do not go away, there comes a time when you have to make a very tough choice.

Right now we are able to say we are not changing the PERSTEMPO or the OPTEMPO goals. Nor will we allow that to happen without a conscious decision. We are working this issue right now with relief for our carrier in the Persian Gulf. If we have to do a heel-and-toe relief on station, we are going to bust somebody's 6-month away from home goal that we set for ourselves. We are resisting that as best we can.

Mr. LANCASTER. One last question. I wonder if you can give sort of an interim assessment of the reconfiguration of the *Teddy Roosevelt*. We heard at one time that that reconfiguration was going to be changed on station. Then there was a decision not to do that. I wonder if you can bring us up to date on the *Teddy Roosevelt*.

First of all, is that reconfiguration going to take place at sea? Second, if it is not, if you can just give us a general assessment at this time based on preliminary information of how that is going.

Admiral ARTHUR. So far, the TR with the special MAGTAF has played very well for us. It gives us an extra key to use in case we need it.

Here a few weeks ago, we were very actively involved in taking a look at restructuring the deck load on the carrier because they needed more ISAR-equipped aircraft. We were able to fix that with a swap-out of P–3s we had on station. We were able to bring new P–3s out with the ISAR radars and satisfy the CINCs demands.

At the same time, we have also put on standby a set of S–3s in case the continuing need is there. If we have to reconfigure, we can do that in a matter of days by bringing the S–3s out. Right now that is on hold because folks on the scene are satisfied they have the capability they wanted for the particular issue they were looking at. But we can do that.

Mr. LANCASTER. How is this amphibious mission for an attack carrier going at this point? Is it too early to tell?

Admiral ARTHUR. I think it is too early to tell. The big problem we have had with TR is that she went right into a very stressful environment and has not had much time off from her primary duties relative to supporting the air picture over Bosnia. For this reason she has not been freed up to do the other part of the mission as we would like. But, again, we still retain that capability on board. If we need to exercise it for real, it is still viable.

We would hope at some point in time we will get her off station long enough to let the Marines get out and stretch their legs a little bit.

Mr. LANCASTER. Thank you, Admiral.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Pickett.

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Hello Admiral. How are you today?

Admiral ARTHUR. Fine, sir.

Mr. PICKETT. Admiral, would you briefly run through the scheme or program for training Navy pilots? When they get through the program of first flight, they go off into the type of aircraft they are expected to fly on a regular basis. Then they train in that aircraft. It could be a S–3, a F–14, an A–6, what have you. Then I think they go on from there?

Admiral ARTHUR. Yes, sir. We basically start all of our pilots out in what we call primary, which refers to the type aircraft, the T–34 Charlie, a turboprop airplane. Here they develop their first basic flying skills, both acrobatics and landing skills so that they are fully qualified to fly in the airplane by themselves.

Then out of that pipeline, we start to make the selection of who will go to helicopters, who will go to tactical aircraft or to the multi-engine aircraft.

As we go into basic, we start tailoring the folks more to the type aircraft that they are going to fly. We fly them in the T–2, which is a jet aircraft, straight wing, very stable and a very forgiving airplane.

At present if they are in the carrier pipeline, those folks will get some basic carrier landings in the T–2. Then, once they are complete, they go on to advance training, flying the A–4 (this will eventually be the T–45). Advance training includes going out to the carrier in the A–4.

At the completion of that they should get their wings. Then they go to the fleet replacement squadrons to fly the particular model of airplane that they are going to fly, F–14s, F–18s, what have you.

As you know, we are in the process of bringing the T–45 into the training command. We still have several months left of testing on this airplane before we will put it into full service. Once we do that, we will have dispensed with the need to do carrier qualifications two times, once in the T–2 and once in the A–4. We will do it just once in the T–45.

So this is another part of the equation of why we are able to reduce the demands on the training carrier and, thus, one of the reasons why we can put it out of service. We are not going to do as many cycles as we have in the past.

Mr. PICKETT. So the new pilots will be doing qualifications in the T–45 and also qualifications in the S–3, the F–14?

Admiral ARTHUR. Yes, sir. Once they get to their fleet replacement squadrons, they go into particular qualifications for that aircraft, both basic mission qualifications and also carrier qualifications; again, before they go to their fleet squadron.

So, in some aspects, we will now see individuals who will fly the T–45 while they are student aviators, and then go out to operational carriers and do their quals with the T–45. They will again come back, get their wings and go to a fleet replacement squadron. Depending on which coast they are training on at the time, they could in fact, go right back to that same carrier in an F–18 or F–14. In fact, they could eventually go to a squadron based on that carrier. So they will be seeing fleet carriers all the way through.

Mr. PICKETT. Don't they train on the ground in the F–14 or what have you before they get out on the carrier?

Admiral ARTHUR. Oh, yes, sir. In the carrier qualification phase on all aircraft, we have a very rigid program that says you must successfully complete *x* number of field landings in that area. They are all graded over a long period of training usually about 2-weeks, where they are routinely, day after day after day, in a landing pattern until the landing signal officers agree that you are now fully safe to take aboard ship; and then they go out to ship and exercise the same practice aboard ship. But we never send anyone directly to a ship without this long workup period, even a fleet pilot. If they have been away from flying for *x* number of days in the fleet, they must come back and safely execute a series of land-based profiles before they go to the ship.

Mr. PICKETT. A large part of that land-based training is carried out at these auxiliary fields Mr. Lancaster was speaking of?

Admiral ARTHUR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PICKETT. What is the effect of the fact we will have fewer air wings on the number of pilots you will be training? What are you looking at in the future as far as the portion or the reduction, perhaps?

Admiral ARTHUR. For our pilot training rate for our carrier based aircraft, we are looking at a steady state of about 300 in the next few years. So we will go into the next decade at about 300 a year which is——

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PICKETT. Be happy to.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. On PTR, pilot training, the Navy said they needed 384 pilot training persons on board. You are saying 300 now?

Admiral ARTHUR. It is a little over 300, plus a few. It is steady state, just over the 300 mark. In the past when I came through the training command back in 1957 and 1958, that number was 2,000.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. My point is I think we have come down; I even talked to Admiral Kelso about this. This is important to some of us, the pilot training numbers. I think we all agreed on 384 at this time.

Admiral ARTHUR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PICKETT. Then, Admiral, what impact does the increased use of simulators have on the way that the Navy trains pilots?

Admiral ARTHUR. In the training command itself, we use simulators for basic emergency drills and to get the individuals comfortable with the configuration of the aircraft they are going to fly.

The complete T–45 program, when it comes on-line, is very much of an integrated picture. We will have a very integrated trainer and training documentation as well as the airplane that is much more integrated than any other system we have had for student aviators.

In the fleet, we use trainers extensively. For fleet aviation, for our F–14s, F–18s, we have full motion simulators. Basically, we are taking about 2 hours of flying time a month that we are doing in simulators that we used to do in the airplane itself.

Over the past few years we have given ourselves credit for simulator systems that I have purchased that are good enough that we can drag off the flying hour program a couple of dollars and do it in the trainer and accomplish the same training.

Mr. PICKETT. Admiral, I was out with Admiral Beaumont and Captain Kennedy this past weekend on the *Kennedy*.

Admiral ARTHUR. I hope they treated you nicely.

Mr. PICKETT. They did.

I wanted to tell you these new pilots who were qualifying were doing an outstanding job. Of course, so was everybody else aboard the vessel. The night operation, as always, is the most impressive thing to see.

Thank you.

Mr. SKELTON. Along that line, Admiral, a number of years ago I was aboard the *Forrestal* watching night landings. As you know, they are very, very impressive. I went up to the wardroom to shake hands with the young pilots. They all looked like boy scouts. It is amazing how capable these young people are who do such work.

Before I call on the next gentleman, I have one question at this time, Admiral. In your prepared statement, sir, you say numerous safety concerns have been raised in relation to student naval aviators conducting carrier qualifications on board a fleet carrier.

Who raised these questions? Who raised these concerns? Would you describe them? Then how do you answer these concerns? Would you mind elaborating on that, sir?

Admiral ARTHUR. Most of the concerns are expressed by those who are internal to Navy, as well as some outside the system who take a late look and say you are changing the way we do business.

We all know that carrier aviation is a very finely tuned evolution. So most people are very comfortable with the procedures that they have. If you were to talk to the commanding officer of a training squadron and ask him would you rather go out to *Forrestal* or take your pilots over to San Diego and go out on *Lincoln*, they would say, "I would rather come down to *Forrestal*," because they are operating off their home field. They are very comfortable with where they are. So that would be their choice.

But, in actuality, we are not changing the procedures. In other words, even when they are operating out of their home base, we do not let the student aviators fly out to *Forrestal* without a fully qualified aviator instructor to lead them out, stay overhead the ship, wait for them to finish and bring them back to the field. So we always have this safety pilot in the air, and we do the same thing when we are doing this on the operational carrier.

The real issue is one that I talked on a little bit earlier, about the speed. There is always concern because the operational carriers have been so used to operating in a much more stressed environment that they will rush the young students. So, in order to make sure that that does not occur, we always take qualified training command people out to the operational carriers. They are up in the tower with the fleet air boss and assistant air boss. If they see the pace starting to pick up faster than they know the students are used to working, they can slow things down.

But everyone is aware that they just need to keep the pace down and not rush. As long as we always have that extra set of eyeballs there to make sure that the pace does not pick up beyond what they are used to, it is a very safe operation.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you very much.

We have with us today the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee Readiness Subcommittee who has special interest in this issue, Mr. Hutto.

Mr. HUTTO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for having this special hearing. It certainly is a warranted one. I know that all of us want our forces to be as well trained as they possibly can be.

Admiral Arthur, good to have you in Pensacola a couple of weeks ago. You did a nice job as the speaker for the luncheon on the Naval Air Symposium. It was well received as always by the Pensacola community.

You were before our Readiness Subcommittee, Admiral, not too long ago. I believe in answer—and I don't want to put the direct quote—but in answer to a question I asked you, in essence you said that if you had your druthers, you would rather have a training carrier because that is what we always had. They have done a good job. I believe from what I am hearing you say today you still feel that way.

I think most people involved in naval aviation do feel that way. I talked to quite a few of them. I believe what we are talking about today is money and money only. When it was announced the *Forrestal* would be decommissioned, I called Admiral Kelso and that is what he said. He said the Secretary of Defense is asking for us to cut, I guess from the Navy, close to $2 billion or something like that. This is one of the things we have to cut.

Well, I notice here, I believe, $98 million annual savings. That is really a pittance, Mr. Chairman, when you think about the overall defense budget. When we think about the safety of our naval aviators, it seems to me the Navy could find savings somewhere else. This is not a big number. From all I can gather, from a safety standpoint, it just makes all the sense in the world because the training carrier is dedicated for that—training rookie pilots. I hope that before it is too late, and it looks like, Mr. Chairman, it almost is too late now to save the *Forrestal*, we all can get together and support this decision.

I realize that we have a drawdown. You are not going to be training as many pilots. But, again, Mr. Chairman, a lot of us, including those in uniform, have, in fact, already done some planning to do some innovative things to make the *Forrestal* a floating classroom, not only for training naval aviators, landing, catapulting off the

carrier, but cryptology classes, and other things that I think could be utilized in a creative way.

Admiral Arthur, of course, Mr. Montgomery and I have a special interest in this. This is where our aviators go and do their carrier qualifications out there all along the Gulf coast. Doesn't it entail quite a bit of additional cost in having the aircraft to go to the fleet carrier and the personnel to go to the fleet carrier to do their qualification?

Admiral ARTHUR. Yes, sir. We figure it is about a million dollars a year, plus we have to provide the training command the additional temporary duty costs to move those aircraft and flight crews to the coast to work off the fleet carriers.

Mr. HUTTO. One of the things that the *Forrestal* has the capability of doing that the *Lexington* did not, is to handle some of the fleet aircraft, or any of the fleet aircraft, I guess the F–14, F/A–18, that sort of thing. So wouldn't that be a valuable thing? Don't the pilots have to do requalification—that is not the word, but—from time to time to update their training?

Admiral ARTHUR. Yes. In fact, in the old days, when the *Lexington* was still capable of handling the fleet aircraft of that era, back during the Vietnam timeframe, we used to come to Pensacola and use *Lexington* as we were going through our fleet replacement pilot training. *Forrestal* does give the capability for an FRS pilot to come and use it; however, the same capability exists with the fleet carriers.

In the past we would use whichever was the most available. In the case of no *Forrestal*, then, of course, we would always use either an east coast or west coast carrier, preferably on the same coast as your workups, but not necessarily.

Mr. HUTTO. What is the amount of money that we authorized and appropriated for the COH for the *Forrestal*? What was it, $156 million? Something like that?

Admiral ARTHUR. That sounds about right. But I will provide that for the record.

[The information was not provided at time of printing:]

Mr. HUTTO. How much has been used in Philadelphia for this purpose?

Admiral ARTHUR. My view is it will be a wash. In other words, at the point we decided to make the turnaround, we virtually spent the same amount of money to lay it up as we would have spent to complete the overhaul. The savings we are generating are on the day-to-day operations and further maintenance that would be done in the day-to-day business.

Mr. HUTTO. You would agree that the *Forrestal* could be utilized in a number of capacities? Wouldn't that be a good thing to be able to give on deck, on board ship training in many ways?

Admiral ARTHUR. Oh, yes, sir. If you have the asset, you need to find more innovative ways to use it.

Of course, we could do that with *Forrestal*; but, again, we are really talking about an affordability issue. Ninety-eight million here, $98 million there is $98 million.

Mr. HUTTO. It is $98 million, but it is so small, so small when you really look at it.

Admiral, I know that you are doing the best you can. I hope that you can prevail on the CNO and others to look at this, but what I don't understand is that the SECDEF's staff told me when we were talking about it very recently, about the decommissioning of the *Forrestal* that this would be looked at in the Secretary's Bottom-up Review. If we are going ahead with the decommissioning, how are we going to do that?

Admiral ARTHUR. Our reading of the Bottom-up Review is that we are probably going to get the equation of 8, 10 or 12. Of course, none of those combinations lead you to an AVT on the side. We were worried which one of those three numbers it will be. But, in any case, if we are fortunate enough to hold on with the 12 number, we still would be hard pressed to find extra dollars to support an AVT.

Mr. HUTTO. Mr. Chairman, just one more question.

Is it feasible, Admiral Arthur, if indeed the *Forrestal* is decommissioned, instead of having the interruptions of the operational carriers and fleet carriers, is it possible to have a training carrier, so to speak, for, say, a period of time, several months, and then be in operational status? In other words, not to mix up the training, have it dedicated for a period of time?

Admiral ARTHUR. It depends on how our worldwide commitments settle out. What we would like to do—and we have sort of mapped out some of the stuff that we have done here—is determine how to accomplish the AVT role with an operational carrier and start to line up the carrier availabilities. We see ourselves coming back more often than not to one carrier on one coast and one on the other, which tend to be more available for whatever the scheduling issues are. I am not sure what they are at this point in time.

If this first blush of that is true, for a year period, one carrier would probably be the predominant training carrier, the one to pick up the training role; and then it would switch to the other coast, depending upon how the cycles go on the carriers.

But I think that that is too early to tell. If we could do that, it is a much more comfortable program.

I have had fleet carriers do training command work. When you do it the second time, shortly after you have done it before, it is a much easier process. So we like to do that whenever we can. We would certainly look at those equations and put this carrier, that has a long turnaround cycle, whichever coast it might be on, and make it the predominant training carrier for the next 9 months or something like this. So it would be on call for those type of periods.

Mr. HUTTO. Thank you very much, Admiral.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, Earl, for being with us.

Admiral, there is a nuclear physicist and Nobel Prize winner by the name of Lord Ernest Rutherford who was once quoted as saying we are short of money, so we must think. I think that is probably where we find ourselves with our military budget today.

Admiral ARTHUR. Yes, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Talent.

Mr. TALENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, I missed your prepared statement. I am sorry about that. I read it.

Let me ask you a couple of questions. It seems what you are telling us is there will not be significant increase in operational tempo; no significant increasing in time at sea for the personnel involved; that you all feel safety is not going to be a problem; and that you can continue to maintain that adequate training.

So I am sitting here thinking why do we have the *Forrestal* at all then? Are you telling us this was something that, if not for this budget crunch, you might not have looked at, but in retrospect, maybe you really didn't need to have a separate training carrier?

Admiral ARTHUR. No. While we could afford it, the training command carrier made a lot of sense, in that you were no longer tied to operational schedules. In other words, you never had to think about one of your operational carriers for a period of time being devoted to another task. In other words, when the ship was ready to be put to sea, you were always looking at the Third Fleet or Second Fleet requirements. These fleets were in the training business before you made your forward deployments. So you were giving them that carrier all of the time for exercise purposes. You let the operators on one end go out and think about exercises and how they wanted to work up the carriers. In the meantime, you had the training command folks focus on one evolution: The need to take *Forrestal* to sea to get the maximum amount of carrier landings and keep the pipeline flowing out to the fleet for the new student.

Mr. TALENT. What you are just telling me is the Navy wasn't spending this $100 million a year to avoid inconveniences in scheduling but rather, if you did the training on one carrier dedicated to that purpose, the people doing that could concentrate on that—the other carriers could concentrate on their duties.

What I hear you telling me, Admiral, and I understand you have to make do with what you have, and what you are ordered to do, is now we are going to increase the risk of a drop in readiness both for the carriers who are out there on patrol duty, and who are now going to have to be worrying about training as well, and also it seems to me the pilots who would have been trained on the *Forrestal*. What we are talking about is an encroachment on training and readiness. Isn't that what we are talking about here?

Admiral ARTHUR. It is an encroachment on training but not readiness. There is readiness involved, excluding the students. That is training. So we will not equate that to readiness per se.

But anytime that you are working a flight deck on a carrier, you are improving readiness. I don't care whether you are working at a slow pace or whether you are working at a fast pace, you are contributing to the readiness of that crew. In reality, when you are doing training command work, you can start bringing more people up on deck. The evolution is being done at a much reduced pace with a much more open deck. The next generation of handlers can watch and get familiar with the procedures.

So I emphasize there is good training going on relative to readiness on that operational carrier, even though it is a different task than they are normally asked to do.

Mr. TALENT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say here we are not even in the outyears of this budget. We haven't even completed the bottom-up review. Notwithstanding the fact we have been told we would not be sacrificing training or readiness, we would not be

moving toward a hollow force, the first steps we have taken this year, that I have been involved in, have been freezing military pay increases and eliminating a training carrier. That, to me, says training, readiness and morale and all the things we are not going to get into.

I don't blame these officers here. They are doing the best they can. There is a comment I think we will see over and over and over again, "now we are cutting into the muscle of America's armed services."

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SKELTON. Which leads me to the next question—thank you, Mr. Talent.

The subcommittee is concerned about the need to maintain adequate training despite the reductions in funding. Are there plans to have training take a greater proportion of the overall cuts?

Admiral ARTHUR. I would hope not. Those of us that are trying to craft out the program over in the Pentagon right now feel very strongly that training is the key to the future. If we go back and look at history and what all the great generals and admirals that took us through World War II were doing back in the 1920s and 1930s, they were all training.

Mr. SKELTON. Going to school.

Admiral ARTHUR. Going to school. We would make a very serious mistake if we forgot that.

Mr. SKELTON. Admiral, what would the costs of maintaining an operational carrier in a permanent training role and yet still available for surge requirements or emergency requirements be?

I shall repeat it. What would the costs of maintaining an operational carrier in a permanent training role and yet available for surge requirements—in other words, take it out and go back to the Persian Gulf?

Admiral ARTHUR. We have looked at that over a period of time, and let me see if I can give you a hard number for the record.

[The following information was received for the record:]

The cost to operate and maintain an operational carrier in a permanent training role with surge requirements in essence equates to a fully operational and deployable carrier. The cost to operate and maintain a carrier is divided into three main categories: ship operations, ship depot maintenance and ship's manpower. Notional annualized costs for a conventional carrier, based on fiscal year 1994, are as follows:

Annualized Cost ($M)

Ship Ops	$27.6
Ship maintenance	47.4
Manpower	97.4
Total	172.4

An AVT is estimated to be $100.1M in fiscal year 1994 dollars.

In general terms, if you want this carrier to be fully ready to go at any time—in other words, fit right into the equation of our other carriers today—then the cost is probably another, I would guess somewhere in the neighborhood of another, $50 to $80 million a year over what *Forrestal* is. That cost would be much greater depending upon what the final number of carriers is, and what the configuration is, in other words whether we are an all nuclear fleet

or still part conventional, part nuclear. So it depends on the specific carrier that you have.

Manpowerwise, it is probably another 1,500 people over what we have with *Forrestal*. Fuelwise, operating days at sea, it is a fraction more because you have all the boilers and you use the steam guys harder than a training command carrier.

The big problem, if you are going to do that, would be to keep that ship very much involved in day-to-day exercises. We can figure out a way to do that, such as the latest exercise we just completed, Ocean Venture. We would want to use that carrier to go down and participate in Ocean Venture or exercises such as that on a routine basis so that they keep the training edge that they need.

We could not leave them just roaming around the Gulf like *Forrestal* did. We would have to take them out and get them involved in Third and Second Fleet exercises to keep the edge on.

Mr. SKELTON. Admiral, we really appreciate your being with us today. I am convinced that one of the great reasons we did so well in the Persian Gulf war was the high level of training that we had in all the services; sea, land and air. The proof is now part of history.

It concerns me that there may be a diminution of the training of any of the services. That is the reason for this hearing.

We really appreciate your being with us today. It is awfully good to see you.

Admiral ARTHUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 10:35 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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